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Urban Environmental Health and Sensitive Populations: How Much 




We use contingent valuation to elicit WTP for a reduction in the risk of dying for 
cardiovascular and respiratory causes, the most important causes of premature mortality 
associated with heat wave and air pollution, among the Italian public. The purpose of 
this study is three-fold. First, we obtain WTP and VSL figures that can be applied when 
estimating the benefits of heat advisories, other policies that reduce the mortality effects 
of extreme heat, and environmental policies that reduce the risk of dying for 
cardiovascular and respiratory causes. Second, our experimental study design allows us 
to examine the sensitivity of WTP to the size of the risk reduction. Third, we examine 
whether the WTP of populations that are especially sensitive to extreme heat and air 
pollution—such as the elderly, those in compromised health, and those living alone 
and/or physically impaired—is different from that of other individuals. We find that 
WTP, and hence the VSL, depends on the risk reduction, respondent age (via the 
baseline risk), and respondent health status. WTP increases with the size of the risk 
reduction, but is not strictly proportional to it. All else the same, older individuals are 
willing to pay less for a given risk reduction than younger individuals of comparable 
characteristics. Poor health, however, tends to raise WTP, so that the appropriate VSL 
of elderly individuals in poor health may be quite large. Our results support the notion 
that the VSL is “individuated.”  
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I. Introduction and Background 
 
The 2001 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) report warns that 
an increase in the frequency and/or intensity of heat waves will raise heat-related 
premature mortality, primarily among the elderly and the urban poor, with the largest 
increases in thermal stresses occurring in cities in temperate regions. Urban areas in 
Europe could, therefore, experience increases in mortality outcomes associated with 
extremely hot weather.  
An unprecedented heat wave affected the European Region during Summer 2003.  
This heat wave was accompanied by an increase in mortality that started early, rose 
quickly, and affected primarily the elderly (75 years-old and older), but was also severe 
within the 45-74 year-old age group.
3 Most of the premature deaths were attributed to 
cardio- and peripheral vascular, cerebrovascular, and respiratory causes.  
Historically, cardiovascular diseases have accounted for 13-90% of the increase in 
overall mortality during and following a heat wave, while cerebrovascular disease 
accounted for 6-52%, and respiratory diseases for 0-14% (Kilbourne, 1997). The adverse 
health effects of heat waves are compounded by the poor air quality that sometimes 
accompanies them. 
                                                 
3 Higher than normal mortality rates were observed in France (20% to 130% increase in mortality rates, 
depending on the region), Portugal (26% percent increase in mortality in August 2003, compared to the 
average of the previous five years), Spain (6% increase in total mortality), and Italy (15% increase in 
mortality for all causes over the Summer mortality figures for 2001 and 2002) (Alberini and Menne, 2003).  
In Italy, the authorities estimate that 34,071 people over the age of 65 died during the period of July 16 to   3
Air pollution is, of course, another major concern for urban areas. A raft of 
epidemiological studies documents both short-term spikes in mortality during high 
pollution episodes and long-term effects of exposures to elevated levels of fine particular 
matter, ozone, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur dioxide.  Kunzli et al. (2000), for example, 
estimate that for the combined population of France, Austria and Switzerland some 
40,000 deaths per year are attributable to fine particulate matter, and Samet et al. (2000) 
estimate 20 to 200 lives lost each day in US cities because of polluted air.   
Because air pollution has been linked to cardiovascular and respiratory effects, 
susceptible populations include children and fetuses, persons with cardiovascular 
illnesses, asthma, emphysema and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and the elderly 
(World Health Organization, 2002). Epidemiological evidence from the US (Pope et al., 
1995) indicates that over 75% of the lives saved by the Clean Air Act are those of 
persons 65 years old and older. 
  The European Union and many European countries are currently adopting policies 
to reduce these mortality effects. Regarding extreme heat, a survey of European countries 
(cCASHh Research Team, 2005) reveals that while only the city of Lisbon had a heat 
advisory program in place by 2002, other countries began to implement similar programs 
in response to the 2003 heat wave. Other possible policies include the creation of green 
islands within urban areas, retrofitting buildings, establishing climate-controlled shelters 
for the population, and emergency response plans. Regarding air quality, the recent Clean 
Air for Europe (CAFE) initiative emphasizes reductions in emissions from stationary and 
mobile sources.  
                                                                                                                                                 
August 15. This is 4,175 more than during the same period in the previous year. See   
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/11/world/main572686.shtml.    4
  Economists would recommend that, when setting these policies, at least some 
consideration be given to their costs and benefits. Ebi et al. (2004) do a complete benefit-
cost analysis of the Philadelphia heat warning system. They use time-series mortality data 
to identify the reduction in mortality associated with the system (an estimated 117 lives 
saved over 3 years), and multiply this figure by an estimate of the Value of a Statistical 
Life (VSL). The resulting mortality benefits are then compared with the cost of the 
system, showing that the former greatly exceed the latter. The VSL figures prominently 
in the cost-benefit analysis of CAFE (Hurley et al., 2005), despite the considerable 
controversy surrounding the mortality effects.
4  
  The VSL can be estimated through a variety of methods. One method is to 
observe the additional compensation that workers must be offered for them to accept 
riskier jobs (Viscusi, 1993). The VSL figures resulting from compensating wage studies 
are frequently transferred to the environmental policy context (US EPA, 2000), even 
though, without further documentation, there is no particular reason to believe that 
workers should exhibit the same preferences for income and risk as the beneficiaries of 
environmental and thermal stress adaptation policies (e.g., the elderly).   
  In principle, it is possible to estimate the VSL using hedonic regressions that 
relate housing prices and wages to climate (Moore, 1998; Maddison and Bigano, 2003) or 
air quality (Portney, 1981), but doing so requires rather restrictive assumptions. An 
alternative is to use contingent valuation, a survey-based approach that asks individuals 
to report directly their willingness to pay (WTP) for a specified reduction in their own 
risk of dying. The VSL is then approximated as WTP/ R ∆ , where   is the risk  R ∆
                                                 
4 There is much disagreement over whether the impacts should be expressed in terms of counts of deaths 
attributable to pollution or loss of life years spread over the population. See Rabl (2004) for a critical   5
reduction. One advantage of using the contingent valuation (CV) method is that 
respondents can be informed about their mortality risks and be told exactly the extent of 
the risk reduction they are to value. In addition, a CV study can be tailored to the specific 
type of risk being considered, a feature that is especially attractive to us, given the dearth 
of VSL figures specific for the cardiovascular and respiratory risks typical of thermal 
stresses and the air pollution context.
5
  The goal of this paper is three-fold. First, we present the results of a contingent 
valuation survey that was administered in Italy for the purpose of obtaining the WTP for 
reductions in the risk of dying for cardiovascular and respiratory causes. This figure can, 
therefore, be used to estimate the benefits of policies that save lives that would be lost to 
thermal stresses, air pollution, and other environmental toxicants (e.g., certain heavy 
metals, such as lead; see US EPA, 1997). To our knowledge, this is the first such study 
conducted in Italy.
6  
  Second, we examine the issue of scope in a contingent valuation survey about 
mortality risk reductions. We vary the risk reduction to the respondents, which allows us 
to test whether the WTP increases with the size of the risk reduction, and, if so, by how 
much.  Economic theory predicts that WTP should be increasing in the size of the risk 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussion of the inference from ecological studies of populations and prospective cohort studies.  
5 The method of contingent valuation can be and has been used to place a value on public goods, 
environmental quality, as well as private goods, including episodes of illness and private mortality risk 
reductions. A recent bibliography (Carson et al., 2002) documents over 5000 papers and articles studying 
or reporting on applications of the method of contingent valuation. 
6 A previous study by Alberini et al. (2004b) elicits WTP for mortality risk reductions, but does not focus 
specifically on the risk of dying for cardiovascular and respiratory causes. Due to the small sample size 
(less than 300 respondents for Italy), Alberini et al. pool data collected in Italy, France and the UK. The 
recent cost-benefit analysis of the Clean Air for Europe Program (Hurley et al., 2005) declined to produce 
VSL figures on a country-by-country basis on the grounds that original WTP data were not available and 
for political considerations.  Yet, in the context of morbidity health endpoints commonly associated with air 
pollution exposures, Ready et al. (2004) show that there may be considerable differences in WTP across 
European countries that are not explained by mere differences in income or other sample demographics,   6
reduction. This relationship is dubbed the “scope” effect, and Carson (2000) underscores 
that credible WTP figures for mortality risk reductions elicited through contingent 
valuation surveys should satisfy the scope effect requirement.  In practice many CV 
studies fail to detect a significant relationship between WTP and the size of the risk 
reduction (Hammitt and Graham, 1999), and Corso et al. (2001) explore the possibility 
that such failure might be due to poor risk communication.  
  Third, we examine whether the WTP for risk reductions is different for 
populations that are particularly sensitive to environmental and thermal stresses and are 
thus the primary beneficiaries of environmental or adaptation policies. We focus on the 
elderly, those with a compromised cardiovascular system and with serious respiratory 
conditions, and those that may be unable to cope with thermal stresses because they live 
alone and/or are physically impaired. We also examine whether persons who take care of 
an elderly and physically impaired family member are willing to pay more for a reduction 
in their own risks. In other words, does this experience change their preferences for risk 
and income? 
  Our findings support the notion that the VSL is “individuated” (Smith and Evans, 
2004; Sunstein, 2004): We find that it varies with the size of the risk reduction, age 
(which we capture into baseline risk) and health status, income, and being a caregiver.  
For the risk reductions considered in this survey, the VSL ranges from €0.257 million to 
over €5.8 million, depending on the baseline risk/age of the beneficiary, size of the risk 
reduction, health status, and statistic used to compute the VSL (median or mean WTP). 
                                                                                                                                                 
which suggests that it is important that European Union-wide figures be corroborated with evidence from 
the individual countries.    7
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the 
concept of VSL and discusses its relationship with age, health status and other factors 
identifying sensitive populations.  Section III presents the survey. Section IV presents our 
econometric models, Section V the data, and Section VI the estimation results. We offer a 
discussion of the results, two policy applications and our concluding remarks in section 
VII.  
 
II. The Value of a Statistical Life and its Determinants 
A. The Value of a Statistical Life 
  The VSL is the marginal value of a reduction in the risk of dying, and is therefore 








=  ,  
where WTP signifies the willingness to pay for a change in the risk of dying, and R is the 
risk of dying. The VSL can equivalently be described as the total WTP by a group of N 
people experiencing a uniform reduction of 1/N in their risk of dying. To illustrate, 
consider a group of 10,000 individuals, and assume that each of them is willing to pay 
€30 to reduce his or her own risk of dying by 1 in 10,000. The VSL implied by this WTP 
is €30/0.0001, or €300,000. The concept of VSL is generally deemed as the appropriate 
construct for ex ante policy analyses, when the identities of the people whose lives are 
saved by the policy are not known yet.    8
  In our contingent valuation survey, we ask individuals to report directly their 
WTP to reduce their risk of dying for specified causes. The WTP for a given risk 
reduction ∆R is then converted into an approximation to the VSL:  VSL ≈ WTP/∆R.
7  
 
B.  Sensitive Populations: The Elderly  
  Deaths linked with environmental exposures and extreme heat occur 
disproportionately among the elderly.  This has led to the question whether the VSL 
should be adjusted for age. Proponents of such an adjustment argue that the VSL should 
be lower for older persons because they have a shorter remaining lifetime. To see how 
this claim compares with economic theory, consider the life cycle model, according to 
which an individual at age j receives expected utility Vj  over the remainder of his 
lifetime: 







t j j C U q V ) ( ) 1 ( , ρ
where   is the present value of the utility of consumption in each period,  , times 
the probability that the individual survives to that period,  , discounted to the present 
at the subjective rate of time preference ρ. T is the maximum lifetime. The specific 
expression of the budget constraint of the individual depends on the assumptions about 
opportunities for borrowing and lending. If, for example, it is assumed that the individual 
j V ) ( t t C U
t j q ,
                                                 
7 Willingness to pay is defined as the maximum amount that can be subtracted from an individual’s income 
to keep his or her expected utility unchanged. Individuals are assumed to derive well-being, or utility, from 
the consumption of goods. Let U(y) denote the utility function expressing the level of well-being produced 
by the level of consumption y when the individual is alive. Further let R denote the risk of dying in the 
current period, and V(y) the utility of consumption when dead. Expected utility is expressed as EU=(1-
R)⋅U(y)+R⋅V(y). This expression is simplified to EU=(1-R)⋅U(y) if it is further assumed that the utility of 
income is zero when the individual is dead. Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the VSL is equal 
to U(y)/[(1-R)U’(y)].   9
can borrow and lend at the riskless rate r, but never be a net borrower, and that the 
individual’s wealth constraint is binding only at T, the VSL at age j is equal to: 
(3)   ∑
+ =
− − + − =
T
j t t t
t t t j
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where Dj is the probability of dying at age j.
8   








 is constant with respect to age, then it can be brought outside 
of the summation in (3), implying that WTP is proportional to the discounted remaining 
life years. If, in addition, the discount rate is zero, then WTP for a reduction in the risk of 
dying is indeed strictly proportional to remaining life years.  
  In sum, adjusting VSL for age to make it proportional to expected remaining life 
years relies on two restrictive assumptions: (i) that the utility divided by marginal utility 
does not vary with age, and (ii) that the discount rate is zero. There is no particular reason 
to believe that these assumptions should be true in practice. For example, if the marginal 
utility of consumption increases with age, then it is no longer appropriate to assume that 
the WTP is proportional to remaining life years.  
  Shepherd and Zeckhauser (1984) assume that the utility function is of the form 
, and consider (i) the situation where the individual is completely self-sufficient and 
cannot borrow or lend, and (ii) the extreme opposite—perfect markets—in which 
individuals can borrow against future earnings and purchase actuarially fair annuities. For 
plausible values of β, in the former case the WTP for a risk reduction has an inverted-U 
shape that peaks when the individual is in his 40s, and in the latter it declines 
monotonically beginning at age 20.  
β C  10
  Some empirical support has been found for both predicted relationships. 
Johannesson et al (1997) find that WTP for a given risk reduction peaks at age 40-50, and 
is lower among younger and older individuals.  Krupnick et al (2002) find that WTP 
declines (by about 30%) only for the oldest age group in their sample of residents of 
Hamilton, Ontario, and report of a similar pattern for a national sample of US residents, 
although in the latter case the effect is not statistically significant. A subsequent 
application of the Alberini et al. survey instrument in the U.K., France and Italy, found a 
similar pattern, but once again the effect was not significant (Alberini et al., 2004b).  
  
C. Sensitive Populations: Persons in Poor Health 
  Equation (3) can be used to examine the value placed on risk reductions by 
persons with chronic cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses. In equation (3), a person 
with a chronic illness has a higher probability of dying in his j-th year of age, D, and 
lower probabilities of surviving to future ages. However, it is not clear how the remaining 
terms in (3) depend on health status, implying that theory does not offer predictions about 
the effect of impaired health on the VSL. 
  Krupnick et al (2002) and Alberini et al. (2004a) find that, if anything, people 
with chronic cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses are willing to pay slightly more, 
rather than less, to reduce their own risk of dying. It remains to be seen whether this 
result is borne out in other studies as well.  
  We are aware of only one CV study that focused on a population who faces an 
elevated risk of dying for cardiovascular causes: Johannesson et al.’s 1991 survey of 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 VSL at age j is defined as the willingness to pay for a marginal change in Dj, the probability of dying at 
age j.   11
hypertensive patients.
9 Based on the results of the Johanesson et al.’s study, we would 
expect people to be prepared to pay to reduce their risk of dying for cardiovascular and 
respiratory causes, especially if they have already being diagnosed to have chronic 
cardiovascular and respiratory conditions. 
 
D. Other Sensitive Populations 
  Many of the people that died prematurely in the Chicago 1995 heat wave were 
persons with mobility impairments, and elderly persons living alone.
10 Lacking air 
conditioning in their homes, and unable to get out and reach climate-controlled 
environments (Klinenberg, 2002), these individuals had been in some cases dead for days 
before worried neighbors called the police. During the heat wave in Europe in Summer 
2003, the highest increase in the mortality rates was observed in nursing homes (Alberini 
and Menne, 2003).  
  Although our survey does not explicit mention heat waves and the reasons why 
old people living alone and persons with mobility impairments might be at higher risk 
during heat waves, we still wish to find out how these people value reducing their risk of 
dying for cardiovascular and respiratory causes. In addition, we wish to see whether 
familiarity with and being responsible for people that due to age or mobility impairments 
need assistance on a day-to-day basis influence our respondents’ WTP to reduce their 
own risks.  
                                                 
9 Patients with high blood pressure were recruited at a clinic in Sweden. The survey questionnaire asked 
these persons to report their subjective baseline risk of dying from heart diseases and other complications 
associated with hypertension, and to estimate the risk reduction afforded by the medication they took on a 
regular basis. These persons were subsequently asked to report their WTP to continue taking the 
medication.  
10 For the week between July 14 and 20, 1995, epidemiologists attributed a total of 739 “excess” deaths to 
the heat wave. The City of Chicago reported 521 heat-related deaths, based on autopsies and police reports.     12
 
III. The Survey 
A. Cardiovascular and Respiratory Mortality Risk Questionnaire  
  As mentioned, many environmental and thermal stresses are linked with excess 
deaths for cardiovascular and respiratory causes. Our questionnaire elicits WTP for 
reductions in the risk of dying for these causes from a sample of Italian citizens. The risk 
reduction we ask people to value is of a private nature.
11 Our questionnaire is self-
administered by the respondent using the computer. This allows us to tailor risks and 
scenarios to the respondent’s individual circumstances (e.g., age, gender, and health 
status) and avoids interviewer bias.   
 
B. Structure of the Questionnaire  
  The questionnaire is divided into seven sections. In section 1, after querying the 
respondent about gender and age, we ask the respondent if he or she has ever been 
diagnosed to have certain cardiovascular and respiratory conditions (including high blood 
pressure, high LDL cholesterol,
12 heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
and emphysema) or diabetes. We also ask people to tell us about the health and longevity 
of other family members, their own current and expected future health, and to what age 
they expect to live. 
  In section 2, we ask questions assessing the respondent’s health over the last four 
weeks, as well as any physical mobility limitations and psychological well-being. Our 
                                                 
11 By focusing on a private risk reduction, we avoid possible double-counting problems due to the difficulty 
of recognizing if individuals are motivated by altruistic concerns, and, if so, the specific nature of these 
altruistic concerns (e.g., paternalistic or non-paternalistic altruism). 
12 This type of cholesterol is commonly dubbed “bad” cholesterol because it can clog arteries, causing a 
heart attack or a stroke.   13
questions are adapted from the Short Form 36 (SF36) questionnaire, which is widely used 
in medical research to assess physical and emotional health.  
  Section 3 provides a simple probability tutorial, leading to the explanation of 
one’s chance of dying, which is expressed as X in 1000 over 10 years, and is graphically 
depicted using a grid of 1000 squares.
13 White squares represent survival, while blue 
squares represent death. Respondents are then tested for probability comprehension. In 
crafting this section of the questionnaire, we kept in mind that because it is difficult for 
many people to grasp the concept of risk and to place a value on mortality risk 
reductions, it is important to communicate risks clearly to the respondents.  
  In section 4, we acquaint respondents with the concept that it is possible to reduce 
one’s risk of dying, and that many people do so on a routine basis. For example, we tell 
respondents that a pap smear can reduce the risk of dying of cervical cancer (in women) 
and that blood pressure medication reduces the risk of dying of a heart attack. We then 
introduce cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses. Respondents can learn more about 
them by reading a glossary which is accessed by double-clicking a link on the screen. The 
respondents are then asked questions about any treatments or actions they are currently 
taking to prevent or cure cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses, and their cost. 
  In section 5, we present the chance of dying for all causes for a person of the 
respondent’s age, gender, and health status. This is shown using blue squares in the grid 
                                                 
13 Assuming that the risk reduction is spread evenly over the 10 years, this is equivalent to X in 10,000 a 
year. As in Alberini et al. (2004a), our initial focus groups revealed that people find the risk reductions 
more credible when they are presented using a 10-year frame. In addition, the visual aids based on the X in 
1000 risk reduction are much clearer than those depicting an X in 10,000 risk.    14
of 1000 squares. We highlight the chance of dying for cardiovascular and respiratory 
illnesses using orange squares, emphasizing that these risks increase with age.
14 
15
  Section 6 presents the hypothetical risk reduction scenario. People were offered a 
risk reduction of X over the next 10 years, where X ranges from 1 to 22, depending on 
the respondent’s age and gender. The extent of the risk reduction was shown visually by 
green squares on the grid. The experimental design for the baseline risk and risk 
reduction is displayed in table 1,
16 and an example of a screen presenting the risk 
reduction to the respondent is shown in Figure 1.
17
                                                 
14 We based our estimate of the respondent’s risk of dying for cardiovascular and respiratory causes on age- 
and gender-specific population mortality. However, respondents were told that the risk was calculated for a 
person of their same age, gender, and health status undertaking their same preventive actions and/or 
treatments (if any). The purpose of doing this was to minimize the chance that respondents might think that 
the baseline risks stated in the questionnaire do not apply to them, which would create a problem of errors-
in-variables in our econometric model (Greene, 2003).     
15 The purpose of showing both the risk of dying for all causes and that of dying for cardiovascular and 
respiratory causes is to make the respondent aware that the latter can be a very small, or a relatively large, 
share of the former, depending on his or her age and gender.  
16 Table 1 shows that after a certain age, people were randomly assigned to one of two possible risk 
reductions. Practical considerations dictated that the absolute risk reduction should be greater for older 
respondents because they have higher baseline risks, although this means that they are given smaller 
percentage risk reductions than younger people. There are a total of nine different risk reductions, which 
should allow us to identify the relationship between WTP and risk change. Our experimental design, 
however, does not allow us to separately identify any additional effect that age may have on WTP above 
and beyond that already captured into baseline risk.  
17 Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two versions of the questionnaire. In Version 1, they 
were asked to imagine that a new medical test is available that is safe and without side effects, and delivers 
the stated risk reduction, but must be done and be paid for every year to be effective. In this variant of the 
questionnaire, the payment mechanism is a co-pay modeled after the fee for medical tests charged by the 
Italian national health care system. Version 2 the questionnaire is similar in all respects, except that people 
are simply asked to imagine that it is possible to reduce their risk by a certain amount, without mentioning 
any other specifics. Our focus groups indicated that people accepted such an abstract risk reduction, and 
that with this approach they tended to focus more sharply on the size of the risk reduction, without being 
distracted by other details. We compare the groups of respondents that received these two “treatments” 
elsewhere (Alberini, Chiabai and Scasny, 2005).  
   15





In the grid on the left, the orange squares show your probability of dying for cardiovascular and respiratory 
causes. In the grid on the right, the green squares show the reduction in your probability of dying for these 
causes. 
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To continue, press the space bar or click on the green button.   16
 
  The payment question is in a dichotomous choice format with one or two follow-
ups.
18 The bid amounts are shown in table 2. Respondents were randomly assigned to one 
of these four bid sets.   
 
Table 1. Baseline risks and risk reductions assigned to respondents in the survey. 
































30-34  12  2  1  30-34  5  2  1 
35-39  15  4  2  35-39  8  2  1 
40-44  23  6  3  40-44  13  4  2 
45-49  37  11  5  45-49  20  5  2 
50-54  62  18  3 or 6  50-54  38  7  3 
55-59  105  34  5 or 8  55-59  49  13  4 
60-64  177  64  5 or 10  60-64  80  25  4 or 5 
65-69  297  122  5 or 12  65-69  138  54  5 or 8 








if yes  if no 
110  250  70 
250  500  110 
500  950  250 
950  1200  500 
 
 
  In section 7 of the questionnaire we describe, and elicit WTP for, a risk reduction 
that takes place X years from now (where X varies with the respondent’s age), when the 
                                                 
18 Respondents who answered “yes” to the first payment question were queried about a higher amount, 
while respondents who answered “no” to the first payment question were asked whether or not they would 
purchase the proposed risk reduction for a lower price. When a respondent answered “no” to both the initial 
payment question and the follow-up question, he or she was asked whether he would pay anything at all to 
obtain the risk reduction, and, if so, exactly how much.    17
respondent is older. To make this question meaningful to the respondents, we show them 
that the chance of dying for any cause and for cardiovascular causes increases as one gets 
older. This future risk reduction question is reserved for respondents of ages up to 60.  
  In section 8, we ask questions that investigate the intertemporal rate of preference 
of the respondent, and his or her aversion to financial risk. Section 9 concludes the survey 
with the usual socio-demographic questions, and with debriefing questions about the 
respondent’s interpretation of the questions. 
  We wish to emphasize that climate change or pollution was never mentioned to 
the respondent in this survey. We chose to do so for two reasons. First, we wished to keep 
the risk reduction a private good, because it is difficult to identify the altruistic 
components of WTP, and to account for them appropriately to avoid double-counting.  
Second, linking risk changes to emissions reductions or adaptation to climate change 
would require that we educate respondents about them, quantify effects, and address the 
uncertainty associated with them. In our opinion, doing so would have resulted in an 
excessively heavy cognitive burden, which prompted us to choose a context-free risk 
reduction.  
 
C. Sampling Plan and Survey Administration  
  In addition to extensive one-on-one testing during the questionnaire development 
work, we pre-tested the final questionnaire in a small pilot study with 20 respondents. 
The final survey was administered at centralized facilities in five cities in Italy—Venice, 
Milan, Genoa, Rome and Bari—on 31 May-9 June 2004, resulting in 801 completed 
questionnaires.    18
  Respondents were recruited from the general population of the residents of those 
cities aged 30-75. The sample is stratified by age, with an equal number of respondents in 
each of three broad age groups (30-44, 45-59, and 60-75), and is comprised of a roughly 
equal number of men and women.  We did not tell prospective participants what the exact 
topic of the survey would be.  
 
IV. Econometric Models  
A. Models of Willingness to Pay 
 
In this paper, attention is restricted to the willingness to pay for the risk reduction 
that begins immediately. Let   denote the individual’s indirect utility, which 
depends on income and the risk of dying R. Willingness to pay,  , is defined as the 
maximum amount of money that can be taken away from an individual at lower level of 
risk to keep his utility unchanged. Formally,  
) , ( R y V
* WTP
(4)     ,  ) | , ( ) | , ( 0 1
* X X R y V R WTP y V = −
where y is income,   is the baseline risk,   is the risk after the reduction (  >  , 
where  ), and X is a vector of individual characteristics. Willingness to pay 
should, therefore, depend on the baseline and final risk, income, and individual 
characteristics:  
0 R 1 R 0 R 1 R
R R R ∆ − = 0 1
(5)   .  ) , , , ( 0
* * X y R R WTP WTP ∆ =
We assume that: 




i i i i i R R WTP ε β
β β ⋅ ∆ ⋅ ⋅ = x  19
where x is a 1×k vector of individual characteristics thought to influence WTP (including 
income:  ),   is the absolute risk change, ε is an error term, and the 
subscript i denotes the respondent. On taking logs, we obtain: 
[] ′ ′ = y i M X x R ∆
(7)   .   i i i i i R R WTP ε β β + ∆ + + = log log log 3 0 2 1
* β x
In other words, the logarithmic transformation of WTP depends on log baseline 
risk, log risk change, and other individual characteristics. Since the baseline risk and the 
risk reduction vary across respondents, their coefficients can be identified in regression 
equation (7).
19  
 We  expect  3 β  to be positive. The magnitude of this coefficient determines the 
sensitivity of willingness to pay to scope, i.e., to the size of the risk reduction. If  1 3 = β , 
willingness to pay is strictly proportional to the size of the risk reduction (Hammitt and 
Graham, 1999).  All else the same, theory suggests that  2 β  should be positive, at least 
when the baseline risk is large (the “dead anyway” effect; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1996). In 
our case, however, due to our experimental design, the effect of baseline risk may be 
confounded by competing risks (see Eeckhoudt and Hammitt, 2001),
20, 
21 and/or offset by 
the effect of age.  
                                                 
19 Implicit in this model is the assumption that the elasticity of WTP with respect to the risk change is 
constant with respect to the baseline risk and to individual characteristics of the respondent. We 
experimented with including interactions between the risk reduction and individual characteristics of the 
respondents (e.g., age) but these models gave unreliable results, which we attribute to the experimental 
design. To keep the risk figures realistic and acceptable to the respondents, we had no choice but to offer 
larger risk reductions to older people (who also have higher baseline risks). The “ideal” design would have 
considered all possible combinations of baseline risks and risk reductions, but this was simply not feasible.    
20 Baron (1997) proposes ways of testing whether individuals are affected by the baseline risk and pay 
attention to relative, in addition to the absolute, risk changes. Also see McDaniel (1992).  
21 Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2001) examine the effect of competing risks, asking how WTP to reduce a 
specific cause of death, and the implied VSL, change as the risk of dying for a competing cause changes. 
They describe the “why bother” effect, whereby an old and chronically ill individual with a large risk of 
dying for, say, cardiovascular causes would be willing to pay very little, or nothing at all, to reduce his or   20
 
B. Estimation Strategy 
  To estimate equation (7), where   is the respondent’s unobserved willingness 
to pay, we begin by recognizing that our sample contains a mix of continuous and 
interval-data observations on willingness to pay.  Observations on a continuous scale are 
contributed by those respondents who answered “no” to both the initial and follow-up 
payment question, and finally reported an exact WTP amount. All other respondents 
contribute interval-data observations. For example, suppose that an individual was 
offered an initial “price” of €250 for risk reduction 
* WTP
i R ∆ , which he declined to pay. He 
was then queried about €110, which he was willing to pay. We interpret this to mean that 
his true willingness to pay for   lies between €110 and €250.  i R ∆
 Assuming  that is a random variate with cdf F(WTP;λ) and pdf f(WTP;λ), 
where λ is the vector of parameters that index the distribution, the log likelihood function 
is thus: 
* WTP
(8)     [] ∑
=
− ⋅ − + ⋅
n
i
Li Hi i i i WTP F WTP F I WTP f I
1
* ) ; ( ) ; ( log ) 1 ( ) ; ( log λ λ λ
where   is a dummy indicator that takes on a value of one if the respondent reported his 
WTP amount on a continuous scale, and zero otherwise. WTP
i I
L and WTPH denote the 
lower and upper bound of the interval around the respondent’s (unobserved) WTP 
amount.  The parameters λ are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood.  
  We assume that WTP follows the Weibull distribution with shape θ and scale σi, 
where ) log log exp( 3 0 2 1 i i i i R R ∆ + + = β β σ β x , which means that  i ε  follows the type I 
                                                                                                                                                 
her risk of dying associated with, say, air pollution exposure. The predictions of their model rest crucially   21
extreme value distribution with scale θ, and that equation (7) is an accelerated-life model. 
Here, λ is comprised of  ,  1 β 2 β  and  3 β . Mean WTP for individual i is computed as 
( ) 1 ˆ / 1 ˆ + Γ ⋅ θ σ i , where Γ(•) is the gamma function, while median WTP is equal to 
, the hats denoting the maximum likelihood estimates. The VSL is 
estimated as mean (median) WTP, divided by the size of the risk reduction.  
θ σ
ˆ / 1 )] 5 . 0 ln( [ ˆ − ⋅ i
 
C. The Choice of the Independent Variables  
  In this study, as a result of our experimental design, the effect of age on 
willingness to pay is captured by the baseline risk, which increases with the respondent’s 
age.  To test whether health status influences willingness to pay, we include in the model 
a dummy (ATRISK) equal to one if the respondent suffers from chronic cardiovascular 
and respiratory illnesses, is diabetic, has high blood pressure, or has high cholesterol. 
  Willingness to pay should, all else the same, increase with the respondent’s 
income. We divide household income by the number of family members (PCAPPINC), 
and enter this variable in the model along with a companion missing income dummy 
(MISSINC).
22  
  Other individual characteristics thought to influence WTP are whether the 
respondent is married (MARRIED), a dummy denoting whether the respondent has 
dependent children of ages 12 and younger (CHILDREN12), and a college education 
dummy (COLLEGE).  
                                                                                                                                                 
on whether the marginal utility of income when one is dead is zero or positive. 
22 Specifically, we created a dummy, MISSINC, that takes on a value of one if the respondent did not 
answer the income question. If so, PCAPPINC is recoded to zero. The recoded PCAPPINC and MISSINC 
must be included in the regression equation together. The coefficient of MISSINC, if significant, captures 
any systematic differences in VSL among those respondents who do and do not report household income.   22
  Finally, we examine the effect on WTP of physical mobility limitations by using 
the dummy IMPEDITO and that of being elderly and living alone using the dummy 
(OLDALONE). The questionnaire asks people whether they take care of a family 
member or other person who, due to age or physical limitation, needs day-to-day 
assistance, whether in the respondent’s home or elsewhere. For those who do, the dummy 
HELP takes on a value of one. We include this dummy to check the effect of familiarity 
with old age, physical limitations and experience as a caregiver. City dummies are 
included to account for possible differences in the cost of living.   
 
V. The Data 
A. Individual Characteristics of the Respondents 
 Descriptive  statistics  of  our survey respondents are displayed in table 3. As shown 
in table 3, the sample is relatively well-balanced in terms of gender, with only a slight 
prevalence of women. The average respondent is 50 years old.  Persons aged 65 and older 
account for 18% of the sample. 
  Almost 70% of the respondents are married, and 16% have children younger than 
12 years of age.  Eleven percent of the respondent has a college degree, although only 
3.44% of our respondents of ages 65 and older do. Regarding household income, 84% of 
the respondents answered the income question. The average income among those 
respondents who did report income information is 21,368 euro a year, which corresponds 
to an average per household member of €8,513 a year.  
                                                                                                                                                 
The coefficient of PCAPPINC must be interpreted as the effect of income, conditional on knowing what the 
respondent income is.    23
  We did not find major differences across cities in terms of respondent socio-
demographics, with two exceptions. One is income, which is, as expected, highest in 
Milan and lowest in Bari (the differences across cities being statistically insignificant). 
The other is college-degree education: The rate is highest in Rome (almost 21%) and 
lowest in Bari (7.41%).  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the respondents.  
Variable   Valid obs.  Mean  Stand. Devn.  Minimum  Maximum 
Male  (dummy)  801  0.48 0.50 0  1 
Age  (years)  801 50.50 13.52 30  77 
OLDER65  (dummy)  801  0.18 0.38 0  1 
Married  (dummy)  801  0.70 0.46 0  1 
CHILDREN12  (dummy)  801  0.16 0.37 0  1 
College degree (dummy)  801  0.11  0.45  0  1 
Household  size  801  2.89 1.22 1  7 
Household income 
(euro/yr) 
677 21,368  8,624 6,000 60,000 
 
 
  Table 4 reports descriptive statistics about the health status of the sample. About a 
quarter of the respondents has high blood pressure, 16% has high low-density cholesterol, 
and serious cardiovascular illnesses are reported by 3-6% of the sample. Emphysema, 
chronic bronchitis and asthma affect 1 to 9 percent of the sample.  
  This means that 49% of the sample has been diagnosed to have at least one 
chronic cardiovascular or respiratory illness (“at risk”). Indeed, 11% of the respondents 
have been admitted to a hospital in the last 5 years for a cardiovascular or respiratory 
illness, and 17% have had to go to the emergency room within this time frame for the 
same reasons. As expected, chronic cardiovascular or respiratory illnesses are more 
frequently reported by the elderly: 71% of the respondents of age 65 and older have at 
least one such condition. We found some variation in illness rates across the cities. For   24
example, our Rome-based respondents reported slightly higher rates of chronic illness 
(measured using the dummy “at risk”) (56% versus 45-47% in the other cities).  
 
Table 4. Health status of the respondents. 
Illness or activity 
Percent of 
the sample
high blood pressure  25.72
high "bad" cholesterol  16.23
Angina  3.25
heart attack  4.87
Diabetes  7.49
other cardiovascular illness  6.24
Stroke  1.5
Emphysema  1.37
Chronic bronchitis  6.74
Asthma  8.74
At risk for cardiovascular and respiratory causes  49.0
Cancer  2.62
Admitted to hospital in the last 5 years for cardiovascular and respiratory illness   11.24
Went to emergency room in the last 5 years for cardiovascular and respiratory illness  17.24
  
  The sample is comparable to the Italian population at large in terms of 
composition by gender (males account for 47% of the Italian population) and educational 
attainment (10.2% of the Italians have a college degree). Because of our age restrictions 
and quotas, the proportion of married people in the sample is higher than in the 
population (the latter being about 49%). In terms of health status, this sample reports 
rates of illness that are very similar to those observed in an earlier study in almost all of 
the same cities (Alberini et al., 2004b). 
  Our respondents tend to come from slightly larger households than the 
population: In the latter, the average household size is 2.69 (Banca d’Italia, 2002), while 
in our sample it is 2.89. Finally, our sample respondents’ income is somewhat lower than 
that of the Italian population: In 2002, the average household income among the latter   25
was €27,868, and the average income per household member was roughly €10,000. (This 
is to be expected, since respondents were asked to take the questionnaire at a centralized 
facility. Presumably, the likelihood of participating in such a study is higher for persons 
with lower incomes, more free time, and lower opportunity cost of time.)   
  The difference with respect to the income population statistics is particularly stark 
among our respondents of ages 65 and older. For these persons, the average household 
income in our sample is €14,385, and the income per household member is €7,443, 
whereas the corresponding statistics for the population in the same age group in 2002 
were €20,000 and €12,000, respectively.  
  Finally, we did a city-by-city comparison between the sample and the population 
(see table A.1 in the Appendix). This comparison suggests that (i) persons with college-
degree education are overrepresented in our Rome sample and underrepresented in Milan 
and Bari, (ii) only in Genoa does the sample match the population in terms of household 
size, and (iii) the average household income in the sample is lower than its population 
counterpart in each city.  These findings imply that it is important to control for 
sociodemographics in our WTP regressions and to use population values for the 
covariates when making predictions for the population’s WTP. 
  
B. Risk Comprehension and Acceptance of Risk 
  Our questionnaire included two quizzes intended to check whether the 
respondents had grasped the concept of probability explained in the probability tutorial. 
The first quiz asks people to indicate which of two people has the higher risk of dying—
the person with a 5 in 1000 risk of dying, or the person with the 10 in 1000 risk of dying.   26
About a quarter of the respondents failed this quiz, but almost eighty percent of those 
who did promptly corrected their answer when offered the opportunity to do so.  
   The second quiz asks people which of those two persons they would rather be. 
About two-thirds of the sample selected the person with the lower risk, 16% chose the 
person with the higher risk, and the remainder said that they were indifferent. When 
queried again, less than 5% of the sample (38 people) confirmed that they wished to be 
the person with the higher risk of dying.  
  Since our questionnaire presents respondents with the baseline risk of dying for a 
person like them, it is important to check whether they accepted the baseline risks stated 
to them in the survey. The responses to a debriefing question at the end of the 
questionnaire indicate that 27.84% of our respondents felt that the baseline risks stated to 
them were roughly what they expected, 15.23% thought that they were higher than 
expected, 11.36% judged them to be lower than expected, and the remainder (45.57%) 
had no idea what to expect. 
 
C. Responses to the Payment Questions 
  Our first order of business is to check that the percentage of “yes” responses to 
the initial payment question declines with the bid amount. As shown in table 5, this is 
indeed the case, implying that the responses to the payment questions are reasonable and 
consistent with economic theory. The percentage of “yes” responses is about 66% at the 
lowest bid amount included in the study, and about 41.3% at the highest. (It should be 
kept in mind that in this survey people value risk reductions of different sizes, but that the 
risk reductions were the same across the four groups assigned to the different bid sets.)  
   27
Table 5. Percentage “yes” responses to the initial payment question (immediate risk 
reduction). 







  Next, we consider the sequences of responses to the initial and follow-up payment 
questions. As is often the case in contingent valuation surveys, the most frequently 
observed pair of responses is “no”-“no” (NN) (40.07%), followed by “yes”-“yes” 
(28.71%). YN and NY combinations account for 19.75% and 11.24% of the sample, 
respectively. 
 
VI. Model Results 
  We begin with reporting the estimation results for equation (7) in table 6. For 
good measure, our regressions are based on a “clean” sample that excludes those 
respondents who failed both probability quizzes on the first attempt (26 respondents). In 
addition, we exclude from the sample those respondents who were assigned a risk 
reduction greater than 12 in 1000. This decision is motivated by two reasons. First, we 
wish to be consistent with a companion survey in the Czech Republic, where   ranged 
from 1 to 12 in 1000 over 10 years. Second, 
R ∆
R ∆  greater than 12 in 1000 over 10 years is 
outside of the range appropriate for the policy applications of this paper.
23  
  We initially included in the regressions city dummies to control for differences in 
the cost of living and other locale-specific factors that could influence WTP, but since the 
                                                 
23 Including observations with large risk changes does not change the results appreciably. The coefficient 
on base risk is similar, and the coefficient on the log risk change is slightly smaller (0.40) and significant at   28
coefficients on these dummies were jointly insignificant, we omit them from the 
specification reported in table 6. 
 
Table 6. WTP for risk reduction, equation (7). Weibull WTP, continuous/interval-data 
model. Cleaned sample (deleted FLAG1=1). N=775. Log Likelihood = -1086.24. 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error  T statistic 
Intercept 7.7677 1.164  6.672
Log base risk ( 2 β )  -0.2465 0.124 -1.993
Log risk reduction ( 3 β )  0.4508 0.223 2.022
ATRISK dummy   0.3701 0.136  2.725
Income per household member (000 euro)  0.0255 0.014  1.783
Missing income dummy  0.0617 0.216  0.286
Male dummy   -0.0933 0.129  -0.724
Married dummy   0.2672 0.146  1.833
Children of ages 12 and younger dummy   0.068 0.181  0.376
College degree dummy   0.1207 0.213  0.566
Weibull shape parameter   0.7084 0.034  20.959
 
 
  As shown in table 6, holding the risk reduction the same, willingness to pay does 
depend on the (log) baseline risk. The coefficient on this variable is negative, which 
means that older individuals—who have larger baseline risks—are willing to pay less 
than younger individuals for any given risk reduction.  By contrast, the coefficient  3 β  on 
the log risk change is positive, as expected, and significant at the 5% level, indicating 
that—holding baseline risk and all else the same—WTP does increase with the size of the 
risk reduction. However, this coefficient is significantly less than 1, implying that WTP is 
less than proportional to the size of the risk reduction.  This result is in line with earlier 
studies (e.g., Alberini et al., 2004a; Alberini, forthcoming, using data from Persson et al., 
2001).  
                                                                                                                                                 
the 10% level, but not at the 5% level. Income exhibits a somewhat stronger association with WTP,   29
  Our regression results also indicate that persons with cardiovascular problems are 
willing to pay, all else the same, about 50% more than persons in better health. This 
effect goes against the conventional wisdom implicit, for example, in the use of quality-
adjusted life years (QALY) measures, which discount programs or interventions that save 
the lives (or extend the lifetimes) of persons in poor health.  
  Finally, willingness to pay increases with income, an effect that is significant at 
the 10% level.
24 Males have a lower WTP, but this effect is not statistically significant, 
and married people have WTP values that are about one-third larger than those of single, 
divorced, or widowed individuals. Having young children, however, does not have a 
statistically discernible effect on WTP, perhaps because any such effect is already 
subsumed into income per household member. Likewise, a higher educational attainment, 
like having a college degree, does not influence WTP. 
  We added regressors—one at the time—to the base specification of table 6 to test 
whether WTP is different for other sensitive subpopulations. In these runs, we found that 
people with mobility impairments (who account for 13.2% of the sample) were willing to 
pay slightly more for the risk reduction, but this effect is not significant at the 
conventional levels.  
  Those respondents who are 65 or older and live alone are prepared to pay less for 
the risk reduction (coefficient -0.679, t statistic 1.81). This result, however, should be 
interpreted with caution, because these individuals make up a tiny share of the sample 
(3.37%), and because we suspect that the coefficient on the OLDALONE dummy picks 
up restricted income. (Income is no longer significant when this dummy is included in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
approaching significance at the 5% level. All other coefficients are virtually the same as those of table 6.    30
regression.) Finally, caregivers (16.85% of the sample) are willing to pay 49% more for 
any given risk reduction. Perhaps taking care of people with limitations due to age and 
impaired mobility raises the salience of the risk reduction valued in this questionnaire to 
the respondents, and this in turn increases willingness to pay.   
  To illustrate the scope effect, and the effect of age, we computed annual mean and 
median WTP for various risk reductions using the base regression of table 6 for two 
males of ages 45 and 65, respectively.
25 Both of these individuals are assumed to be 
healthy, married without children, and to have income per household member equal to 
the Italian average (€10,000). Our calculations—displayed for median WTP in figure 2—
confirm that WTP grows with the risk reduction, but at a decreasing rate.  
  As shown in figure 2, it is also clear that the older individual’s WTP is lower than 
that of the younger individual for all risk reductions, income and other characteristics 
being the same.  The 45-year-old’s median WTP ranges from €182 a year (for the risk 
reduction of 1 in 10,000 a year) to €559 (for the risk reduction of 12 in 10,000 a year). By 
contrast, the 65-year-old’s annual median WTP ranges from €101 to €309.      
                                                                                                                                                 
24 It is comforting that the missing income dummy is not significant. This means that on average the WTP 
figures of those persons who did not report their income are not different from those of those respondents 
who did.  
25 We remind the reader that by our experimental design, a 45-year-old and a 65-year-old are both asked to 
value a risk reduction of 5 in 1000 over ten years.     31
 
Figure 2. 
WTP for individuals of different ages: 45- and 65-year-olds 
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  In Figure 3, attention is restricted to the 5 in 1000 risk reduction (5 in 10,000 in a 
year). We plot median WTP per year against age, which influences WTP via the baseline 
risk. It is clear that, as follows from the regression of table 5, WTP for the same risk 
reduction—and hence the VSL—declines with age. Holding the risk reduction the same, 
the WTP of the oldest people in our sample is less than half that of the youngest people in 
the sample.   
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Figure 3. 
































    
 
Figure 4. 
WTP for individuals of different ages 
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  In figure 4, we examine the issue of health status. In this figure, we plot the 
median WTP of the 45-year-old and the 65-year-old of the preceding examples, except 
that the 65-year-old is assumed to be suffering from a chronic cardiovascular or 
respiratory condition (or is at elevated risk because he is a diabetic). Clearly, the WTP of 
the elderly person now exceeds that of his younger and healthier counterpart. 
  As shown in table 7, the VSL of 45-year old is €1.824 million or €3.875 million 
(based on median and mean WTP, respectively) when referred to a 1 in 1000 risk 
reduction over 10 years, and €0.754 million or €1.601 million when referred to a 5 in 
1000 risk reduction. For the healthy 65-year-old, the VSL is €1 million or €2.141 million 
(1 in 1000 risk reduction, median and mean WTP, respectively) and €0.417 million or 
€0.885 million (5 in 1000 risk reduction, median and mean WTP). When this 65-year-old 
is assumed to be in compromised health, however, the VSL is considerably higher, 
ranging from $1 million to €5.8 million, depending on the size of the risk reduction and 
the welfare statistic used.  
 
Table 7. VSL in million Euro.  
45-year-old (healthy)  65-year-old (healthy)  65-year-old (at risk)   

















1 in 1000 over 10 years 
(1 in 10,000 a year) 
1.824 3.875 1.008 2.141 2.740 5.821 
5 in 1000 over 10 years 
(5 in 10,000 a year) 
0.754 1.601 0.417 0.885 1.132 2.405 
Calculations assume average income per household member in Italy, male, married, no 
children, no college degree.  
 
  These figures encompass those obtained for a 5 in 1000 risk reduction over 10 
years by Alberini et al. (2004a) in the US and Alberini et al. (2004b) in the UK, France   34
and Italy, although neither set of authors focuses specifically on cardiovascular and 
respiratory causes.    
  In sum, our results show that the VSL figure is not a fixed constant: The VSL 
varies with the baseline risk and with the size of the risk reduction valued by the 
respondent. The VSL would be a constant if  2 β  was zero,  3 β  was equal to one, and none 
of the covariates were found to be significantly associated with WTP. 
 
 VII. Discussion and Conclusions.  
We have presented the results of an original contingent valuation study that elicits 
the value of a reduction in the risk of dying for cardiovascular and respiratory causes 
from a sample of Italians living in large Italian cities.  We ask people to value private risk 
reductions, without mentioning climate change and adaptation policies or air pollution, to 
avoid possible double-counting of the benefits and to avoid imposing an excessive 
cognitive burden on the respondents.  The VSL figures elicited from this study can be 
used for estimating the mortality benefits of adaptation policies that save lives during 
heat waves and of other environmental policies that limit exposure to pollutants that 
cause or worsen cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses. 
  The responses to the WTP questions in our survey are broadly consistent with the 
economic paradigm and suggest that people understood the commodity being valued. We 
find that WTP does increase with the size of the risk reduction, but in a less than 
proportional fashion, a result that confirms earlier findings in Alberini et al. (2004a), 
Alberini (2005), and Hammitt and Graham (1999).  
The VSL is not a fixed constant for all risk reductions. For the risk reductions 
studied in this paper (1 to 12 in 10,000 a year, or 1 to 12 in 1,000 over 10 years), the VSL   35
ranges from €0.257 million to over €5.8 million, depending on the baseline risk (age of 
the beneficiary), size of the risk reduction, health status, and statistic used to compute the 
VSL (median or mean WTP). We paid special attention to (sub-) populations that are 
regarded as especially sensitive to the environmental health risks in urban areas. We 
found that indeed the WTP for a given risk reduction, and hence the VSL, is lower among 
the elderly
26 and higher among subjects at elevated risk because of existing 
cardiovascular and respiratory conditions.  Elderly persons living alone—a population of 
concern during heat waves—report a lower WTP, but this finding should be interpreted 
with caution, because we only have few such persons in our sample and because we 
suspect this effect may overlap with that of their low incomes.  
We also found that respondents were willing to pay more when they are 
caregivers for impaired or elderly family members. Perhaps familiarity with physical 
impairments and old age increases the salience of the risk reductions valued in this 
questionnaire to the respondents. Taken together, our regression analyses support the 
claim that the VSL is “individuated” (i.e., individual-specific).
27  
How do these figures compare with estimates of the VSL from other studies? In 
Maddison and Bigano (2003) the amenity effects of climate are captured in two markets: 
The housing market and the labor market. The amenity effect of climate is its effect on 
wages ( ) minus its effect on housing prices ( C w ∂ ∂ / C h ∂ ∂ / ), and is estimated using data 
from Italy. Their regressions indicate that, absent any changes in the precipitation 
                                                 
26 For comparison, while US government agencies no longer discount the VSL for age in policy analyses 
(Skrzycki, 2003), the Directorate-General Environment of the European Commission does apply an age 
adjustment to its VSL figure.  
See http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/others/recommended_interim_values.pdf.  
27 See, for example, Smith et al., 2004. Whether or not government agencies should account for 
individuated VSLs is, of course, another matter. Sunstein (2004) acknowledges the informational burden   36
patterns, Italians would be prepared to pay about €325-370 per household per year to 
avoid a one-degree increase in July temperatures.  Combining these results with the 
excess deaths recorded in Rome in Summer 2003, and assuming that the value of the 
disamenity reflects entirely the excess deaths due to the heat wave, we obtain a VSL of 
€3.345 million.
28 This figure falls within the range of VSL values estimated directly in 
our study.  
  How can we apply our VSL figures to the mortality risks of thermal stresses? We 
use calculations by Kovats (2003), who estimates the mortality risks associated with 
changes in mean temperature in Italy, allowing for physiological adaptation to hotter 
weather (but no public adaptation programs). Her calculations imply that from 2000 to 
2020 the risk of dying for cardiovascular and respiratory causes during heat waves would 
increase from 0.71 in 10,000 to 0.91 in 10,000 for persons of ages up to 65, and from 
9.19 in 10,000 to 11.70 in 10,000 for the elderly (ages 65 and older).
29 When these rates 
are applied to the relevant age groups of the population of Rome, for example, they 
predict a total of 165 and 211 deaths for the younger group, and 440 and 561 for the older 
group. (For simplicity, in these calculations we hold the population the same as now.) 
    We compute two conservative estimates of VSL based on median WTP for 
individuals at risk and for the appropriate size of the risk reduction (about 1 in 10,000 a 
year, and 2.5 in 10,000 a year, respectively, for a 45-year-old and for a 65-year-old). 
These two VSL figures are equal to €1.784 million and €1.657 million. Assuming no 
                                                                                                                                                 
required of agencies, should they pursue full individuation, but also points out that in some cases, as in the 
case of clean air, individuation is not desirable, because people cannot be excluded from clean air.  
28 See Alberini et al. (forthcoming) for details on these calculations. We wish to point out that these figures 
should be regarded as an upper bound, because they assume that housing price and wage differentials 
reflect solely differences in mortality risks across locales with different climate, and that amenity effects 
and aesthetics do not matter. 
29 These risks are expressed on an annual basis. They were calculated for Milan and Rome.    37
discounting for the sake of simplicity, the monetized mortality damages in the absence of 
adaptation programs are thus €281 million for the year 2020 (2004 euro) for the city of 
Rome alone. Policies that were able to avoid some of these deaths would be credited for 
the corresponding benefits, which would have to be compared with the costs of the 
program for a complete benefit-cost analysis.  
To illustrate the potential use of our VSL figures in the air pollution context, 
WHO (2002) estimates that 3473 deaths would be avoided among the population of age 
30 and older if it were possible to reduce particulate matter of diameter less than 10 
micron (PM10) from the current average (52.6 µg/m
3) in the eight largest Italian cities 
(Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Palermo, Genoa and Bologna) to 30 µg/m
3. These 
calculations do not distinguish for the ages and susceptibility of the persons exposed to 
outdoor air pollution and assume only long-term mortality effects. This implies that we 
must use the VSL of a person of average age (the average age in Italy is 40.6 years) for a 
risk reduction of about 6 in 10,000 annually (the risk reduction implied by WHO’s 
calculations). At the average income per household member in the population, the 
relevant VSL figures are €0.730 million (based on median WTP) or €1.533 million 
(based on mean WTP). This target level of particulate matter would, therefore, bring 
reductions in mortality worth €2,535 million to €5,323 million per year.  
Our estimates provide independent support for the EU-wide figures recommended 
in the cost-benefit analysis of the Clean Air for Europe program, which are equal to 
€0.980 million and €2.0 million, respectively (2000 euro). Our VSL figures bracket those 
used by the European Commission, whose baseline central VSL is €1.4 million, but are 
below that used by the US Environmental Protection Agency (1999, 2000) ($6.1 million 
1999 dollars).    38
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Appendix. 
 
Table A.1. City-by-city comparison between sample and population.  
 
College degree 
(percent)  Household  size  Annual household income (euro) 





Milano  15.6%  8.46 2.58 (Northern Italy)  2.7332,774 (Northern Italy)  24,277
Venezia  9.4%  11.32 2.58 (Northern Italy)  2.8232,774 (Northern Italy)  19,038
Genova  10.1%  9.88 2.58 (Northern Italy)  2.5832,774 (Northern Italy)  17,889
Roma  13.9%  20.89 2.61 (Central Italy)  3.0629,355 (Central Italy)  20,620
Bari  11.5%  7.41 2.89 (Southern Italy)   2.9920,172 (Southern Italy)  13,667
* = Source: Banca d’Italia (2002). Regional statistics are used when city-level 
statistics are not available.  
 
  
NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 







NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2004 
    
IEM 1.2004  Anil MARKANDYA, Suzette PEDROSO and Alexander GOLUB: Empirical Analysis of National Income and 
So2 Emissions in Selected European Countries
 
ETA 2.2004  Masahisa FUJITA and Shlomo WEBER: Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries
PRA 3.2004  Adolfo DI CARLUCCIO, Giovanni FERRI, Cecilia FRALE and Ottavio RICCHI: Do Privatizations Boost 
Household Shareholding? Evidence from Italy 
ETA 4.2004  Victor GINSBURGH and Shlomo WEBER: Languages Disenfranchisement in the European Union 
ETA 5.2004  Romano PIRAS: Growth, Congestion of Public Goods, and Second-Best Optimal Policy 
CCMP 6.2004  Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Lessons from the Polder: Is Dutch CO2-Taxation Optimal 
PRA 7.2004  Sandro BRUSCO, Giuseppe LOPOMO and S. VISWANATHAN (lxv): Merger Mechanisms 
PRA 8.2004  Wolfgang AUSSENEGG, Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): IPO Pricing with Bookbuilding, and a 
When-Issued Market  
PRA 9.2004  Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): Primary Market Design: Direct Mechanisms and Markets 
PRA 10.2004  Florian ENGLMAIER, Pablo GUILLEN, Loreto LLORENTE, Sander ONDERSTAL and Rupert SAUSGRUBER 
(lxv): The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions 
PRA 11.2004  Bjarne BRENDSTRUP and Harry J. PAARSCH (lxv): Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-
Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders 
PRA 12.2004  Ohad KADAN (lxv): Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values  
PRA 13.2004  Maarten C.W. JANSSEN (lxv): Auctions as Coordination Devices 
PRA 14.2004  Gadi FIBICH, Arieh GAVIOUS and Aner SELA (lxv): All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers 
PRA 15.2004  Orly SADE, Charles SCHNITZLEIN and Jaime F. ZENDER (lxv): Competition and Cooperation in Divisible 
Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination 
PRA 16.2004  Marta STRYSZOWSKA (lxv): Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price Internet Auctions 
CCMP 17.2004  Slim Ben YOUSSEF: R&D in Cleaner Technology and International Trade 
NRM 18.2004  Angelo ANTOCI, Simone BORGHESI and Paolo RUSSU (lxvi): Biodiversity and Economic Growth: 
Stabilization Versus Preservation of the Ecological Dynamics 
SIEV 19.2004  Anna ALBERINI, Paolo ROSATO, Alberto LONGO  and Valentina ZANATTA: Information and Willingness to 
Pay in a Contingent Valuation Study: The Value of S. Erasmo in the Lagoon of Venice 
NRM  20.2004  Guido CANDELA and Roberto CELLINI (lxvii): Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of 
Differentiated Oligopoly 
NRM  21.2004  Jacqueline M. HAMILTON (lxvii): Climate and the Destination Choice of German Tourists 
NRM  22.2004 
Javier Rey-MAQUIEIRA PALMER, Javier LOZANO IBÁÑEZ  and Carlos Mario GÓMEZ GÓMEZ (lxvii): 
Land, Environmental Externalities and Tourism Development 
NRM  23.2004  Pius ODUNGA and Henk FOLMER (lxvii): Profiling Tourists for Balanced Utilization of Tourism-Based 
Resources in Kenya 
NRM  24.2004  Jean-Jacques NOWAK, Mondher SAHLI and Pasquale M. SGRO (lxvii):Tourism, Trade and Domestic Welfare 
NRM  25.2004  Riaz SHAREEF (lxvii): Country Risk Ratings of Small Island Tourism Economies 
NRM  26.2004  Juan Luis EUGENIO-MARTÍN, Noelia MARTÍN MORALES and Riccardo SCARPA (lxvii): Tourism and 
Economic Growth in Latin American Countries: A Panel Data Approach 
NRM  27.2004  Raúl Hernández MARTÍN (lxvii): Impact of Tourism Consumption on GDP. The Role of Imports  
CSRM  28.2004  Nicoletta FERRO: Cross-Country Ethical Dilemmas in Business: A Descriptive Framework 
NRM  29.2004  Marian WEBER (lxvi): Assessing the Effectiveness of Tradable Landuse Rights for Biodiversity Conservation: 
an Application to Canada's Boreal Mixedwood Forest 
NRM 30.2004 
Trond BJORNDAL, Phoebe KOUNDOURI and Sean PASCOE (lxvi): Output Substitution in Multi-Species 
Trawl Fisheries: Implications for Quota Setting 
CCMP  31.2004  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA, Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on 
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part I: Sectoral Analysis of Climate Impacts in Italy 
CCMP  32.2004  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA ,Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on 
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part II: Individual Perception of Climate Extremes in Italy 
CTN  33.2004  Wilson PEREZ: Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution 
KTHC  34.2004  Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxviii): The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence 
from US Cities 
KTHC  35.2004  Linda CHAIB (lxviii): Immigration and Local Urban Participatory Democracy: A Boston-Paris Comparison KTHC  36.2004  Franca ECKERT COEN and Claudio ROSSI  (lxviii): Foreigners, Immigrants, Host Cities: The Policies of 
Multi-Ethnicity in Rome. Reading Governance in a Local Context 
KTHC  37.2004  Kristine CRANE (lxviii): Governing Migration: Immigrant Groups’ Strategies in Three Italian Cities – Rome, 
Naples and Bari 
KTHC  38.2004  Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxviii): Mind in Africa, Body in Europe: The Struggle for Maintaining and Transforming 
Cultural Identity - A Note from the Experience of Eritrean Immigrants in Stockholm 
ETA  39.2004  Alberto CAVALIERE: Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly 
PRA  40.2004  Andrea BIGANO and Stef PROOST: The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental 
Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
CCMP  41.2004  Micheal FINUS (lxix): International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems 
KTHC  42.2004  Francesco CRESPI: Notes on the Determinants of Innovation: A Multi-Perspective Analysis 
CTN  43.2004  Sergio CURRARINI and Marco MARINI: Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies 
CTN  44.2004  Marc ESCRIHUELA-VILLAR: Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability 
NRM  45.2004  Sebastian BERVOETS and Nicolas GRAVEL (lxvi): Appraising Diversity with an Ordinal Notion of Similarity: 
An Axiomatic Approach 
NRM  46.2004  Signe ANTHON and Bo JELLESMARK THORSEN (lxvi):  Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric 
Information on Private Environmental Benefits 
NRM  47.2004  John MBURU (lxvi): Wildlife Conservation and Management in Kenya: Towards a Co-management Approach 
NRM  48.2004  Ekin BIROL, Ágnes GYOVAI  and Melinda SMALE (lxvi): Using a Choice Experiment to Value Agricultural 
Biodiversity on Hungarian Small Farms: Agri-Environmental Policies in a Transition al Economy 
CCMP  49.2004  Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: The EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Allowance Prices, Trade Flows, 
Competitiveness Effects 
GG  50.2004  Scott BARRETT and Michael HOEL: Optimal Disease Eradication 
CTN  51.2004  Dinko DIMITROV, Peter BORM, Ruud HENDRICKX and Shao CHIN SUNG: Simple Priorities and Core 
Stability in Hedonic Games 
SIEV  52.2004  Francesco RICCI: Channels of Transmission of Environmental Policy to Economic Growth: A Survey of the 
Theory 
SIEV  53.2004  Anna ALBERINI, Maureen CROPPER, Alan KRUPNICK and Nathalie B. SIMON: Willingness to Pay for 
Mortality Risk Reductions: Does Latency Matter? 
NRM  54.2004 
Ingo BRÄUER and Rainer MARGGRAF (lxvi):  Valuation of Ecosystem Services Provided by Biodiversity 
Conservation: An Integrated Hydrological and Economic Model to Value the Enhanced Nitrogen Retention in 
Renaturated Streams 
NRM  55.2004  Timo GOESCHL and  Tun LIN (lxvi): Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and 
Regulatory Choices  
NRM 56.2004  Tom DEDEURWAERDERE (lxvi): Bioprospection: From the Economics of Contracts to Reflexive Governance 
CCMP 57.2004  Katrin REHDANZ  and David MADDISON: The Amenity Value of Climate to German Households 
CCMP 58.2004 
Koen SMEKENS and Bob VAN DER ZWAAN: Environmental Externalities of Geological Carbon Sequestration 
Effects on Energy Scenarios 
NRM 59.2004  Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxvii): Using Data Envelopment 
Analysis to Evaluate Environmentally Conscious Tourism Management 
NRM 60.2004  Timo GOESCHL and Danilo CAMARGO IGLIORI (lxvi):Property Rights Conservation and Development: An 
Analysis of Extractive Reserves in the Brazilian Amazon 
CCMP 61.2004  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO:  Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a 
Technology-based Climate Protocol 
NRM 62.2004  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Resource-Abundance and Economic Growth in the U.S. 
NRM 63.2004 
Györgyi BELA, György PATAKI, Melinda SMALE and Mariann HAJDÚ (lxvi): Conserving Crop Genetic 
Resources on Smallholder Farms in Hungary: Institutional Analysis 
NRM 64.2004  E.C.M. RUIJGROK and E.E.M. NILLESEN (lxvi): The Socio-Economic Value of Natural Riverbanks in the 
Netherlands 
NRM 65.2004  E.C.M. RUIJGROK (lxvi): Reducing Acidification: The Benefits of Increased Nature Quality. Investigating the 
Possibilities of the Contingent Valuation Method 
ETA 66.2004  Giannis VARDAS and Anastasios XEPAPADEAS: Uncertainty Aversion, Robust Control and Asset Holdings 
GG 67.2004  Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Constadina PASSA: Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary 
Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach 
GG 68.2004  Michael FINUS: Modesty Pays: Sometimes!  
NRM 69.2004 
Trond BJØRNDAL and Ana BRASÃO: The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Management and Policy 
Implications 
CTN 70.2004  Alejandro CAPARRÓS, Abdelhakim HAMMOUDI and Tarik TAZDAÏT: On Coalition Formation with 
Heterogeneous Agents  
IEM 71.2004  Massimo GIOVANNINI, Margherita GRASSO, Alessandro LANZA and Matteo MANERA: Conditional 
Correlations in the Returns on Oil Companies Stock Prices and Their Determinants 
IEM 72.2004  Alessandro LANZA,  Matteo MANERA and Michael MCALEER: Modelling Dynamic Conditional Correlations 
in WTI Oil Forward and Futures Returns 
SIEV 73.2004  Margarita GENIUS and Elisabetta STRAZZERA: The Copula Approach to Sample Selection Modelling: 
An Application to the Recreational Value of Forests CCMP 74.2004  Rob DELLINK and Ekko van IERLAND: Pollution Abatement in the Netherlands: A Dynamic Applied General 
Equilibrium Assessment 
ETA 75.2004  Rosella LEVAGGI and Michele MORETTO: Investment in Hospital Care Technology under Different 
Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach 
CTN 76.2004  Salvador BARBERÀ and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in
a Heterogeneous Union 
CTN 77.2004  Àlex ARENAS, Antonio CABRALES, Albert DÍAZ-GUILERA, Roger GUIMERÀ and Fernando VEGA-
REDONDO (lxx): Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion 
CTN 78.2004  Francis BLOCH and Armando GOMES (lxx): Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options 
CTN 79.2004  Rabah AMIR, Effrosyni DIAMANTOUDI and Licun XUE (lxx): Merger Performance under Uncertain Efficiency 
Gains 
CTN 80.2004  Francis BLOCH and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players 
CTN 81.2004  Daniel DIERMEIER, Hülya ERASLAN and Antonio MERLO (lxx): Bicameralism and Government Formation 
CTN 82.2004  Rod GARRATT, James E. PARCO, Cheng-ZHONG QIN and Amnon RAPOPORT (lxx): Potential Maximization  
and Coalition Government Formation 
CTN 83.2004  Kfir ELIAZ, Debraj RAY and Ronny RAZIN (lxx): Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement 
CTN 84.2004  Sanjeev GOYAL, Marco van der LEIJ and José Luis MORAGA-GONZÁLEZ (lxx): Economics: An Emerging 
Small World?  
CTN 85.2004  Edward CARTWRIGHT (lxx): Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players 
IEM 86.2004  Finn R. FØRSUND and Michael HOEL: Properties of a Non-Competitive Electricity Market Dominated by 
Hydroelectric Power 
KTHC   87.2004  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources, Investment and Long-Term Income  
CCMP 88.2004  Marzio GALEOTTI and Claudia KEMFERT: Interactions between Climate and Trade Policies: A Survey 
IEM 89.2004  A. MARKANDYA, S. PEDROSO  and D. STREIMIKIENE: Energy Efficiency in Transition Economies: Is There 
Convergence Towards the EU Average? 
GG 90.2004  Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL : Climate Agreements and Technology Policy 
PRA 91.2004  Sergei IZMALKOV (lxv): Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction 
KTHC 92.2004  Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI: Cities and Cultures 
KTHC 93.2004  Massimo DEL GATTO:  Agglomeration, Integration, and Territorial Authority Scale in a System of Trading 
Cities. Centralisation versus devolution 
CCMP 94.2004  Pierre-André JOUVET, Philippe MICHEL and Gilles ROTILLON: Equilibrium with a Market of Permits 
CCMP 95.2004  Bob van der ZWAAN  and Reyer GERLAGH:  Climate Uncertainty and the Necessity to Transform Global 
Energy Supply 
CCMP 96.2004  Francesco BOSELLO, Marco LAZZARIN, Roberto ROSON and Richard S.J. TOL: Economy-Wide Estimates of 
the Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise 
CTN 97.2004  Gustavo BERGANTIÑOS and  Juan J. VIDAL-PUGA: Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through 
the Canonical Form  
CTN 98.2004  Siddhartha BANDYOPADHYAY and Mandar OAK: Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of 
Proportional Representation 
GG 99.2004  Hans-Peter WEIKARD, Michael FINUS and Juan-Carlos ALTAMIRANO-CABRERA: The Impact of Surplus 
Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements 
SIEV 100.2004  Chiara M. TRAVISI and Peter NIJKAMP: Willingness to Pay for Agricultural Environmental Safety: Evidence 
from a Survey of Milan, Italy, Residents 
SIEV 101.2004  Chiara M. TRAVISI, Raymond J. G. M. FLORAX and Peter NIJKAMP:
 A Meta-Analysis of the Willingness to 
Pay for Reductions in Pesticide Risk Exposure 
NRM 102.2004  Valentina BOSETTI and David TOMBERLIN: Real Options Analysis of Fishing Fleet Dynamics: A Test  
CCMP 103.2004  Alessandra GORIA e Gretel GAMBARELLI: Economic Evaluation of Climate Change Impacts and Adaptability 
in Italy  
PRA 104.2004  Massimo FLORIO and Mara GRASSENI: The Missing Shock: The Macroeconomic Impact of British 
Privatisation 
PRA 105.2004  John BENNETT, Saul ESTRIN, James MAW and Giovanni URGA: Privatisation Methods and Economic Growth 
in Transition Economies 
PRA 106.2004  Kira BÖRNER: The Political Economy of Privatization: Why Do Governments Want Reforms? 
PRA 107.2004  Pehr-Johan NORBÄCK and Lars PERSSON: Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets 
SIEV 108.2004 
Angela GRANZOTTO, Fabio PRANOVI, Simone LIBRALATO, Patrizia TORRICELLI and Danilo 
MAINARDI: Comparison between Artisanal Fishery and Manila Clam Harvesting in the Venice Lagoon by 
Using Ecosystem Indicators: An Ecological Economics Perspective 
CTN 109.2004  Somdeb LAHIRI:  The Cooperative Theory of Two Sided Matching Problems: A Re-examination of  Some 
Results 
NRM 110.2004  Giuseppe DI VITA: Natural Resources Dynamics: Another Look 
SIEV 111.2004  Anna ALBERINI, Alistair HUNT and Anil MARKANDYA: Willingness to Pay to Reduce Mortality Risks:  
Evidence from a Three-Country Contingent Valuation Study 
KTHC 112.2004  Valeria PAPPONETTI and  Dino PINELLI: Scientific Advice to Public Policy-Making 
SIEV 113.2004  Paulo A.L.D. NUNES and Laura ONOFRI: The Economics of Warm Glow: A Note on Consumer’s Behavior 
and Public Policy Implications 
IEM 114.2004  Patrick CAYRADE: Investments in Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Infrastructure What is the Impact 
on the Security of Supply? 
IEM 115.2004  Valeria COSTANTINI and Francesco GRACCEVA:  Oil Security. Short- and Long-Term Policies IEM 116.2004  Valeria COSTANTINI and Francesco GRACCEVA:  Social Costs of Energy Disruptions 
IEM 117.2004 
Christian EGENHOFER, Kyriakos GIALOGLOU, Giacomo LUCIANI, Maroeska BOOTS, Martin SCHEEPERS, 
Valeria COSTANTINI, Francesco GRACCEVA, Anil MARKANDYA and Giorgio VICINI: Market-Based Options 
for Security of Energy Supply 
IEM 118.2004  David FISK: Transport Energy Security. The Unseen Risk? 
IEM 119.2004  Giacomo LUCIANI: Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets. What is it and What is it not? 
IEM 120.2004  L.J. de VRIES and R.A. HAKVOORT: The Question of Generation Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets  
KTHC 121.2004  Alberto PETRUCCI: Asset Accumulation, Fertility Choice and Nondegenerate Dynamics in a Small Open 
Economy  
NRM 122.2004  Carlo GIUPPONI, Jaroslaw MYSIAK and Anita FASSIO: An Integrated Assessment Framework for Water 
Resources Management: A DSS Tool and a Pilot Study Application 
NRM 123.2004  Margaretha BREIL, Anita FASSIO, Carlo GIUPPONI and Paolo ROSATO: Evaluation of Urban Improvement 
on the Islands of the Venice Lagoon: A Spatially-Distributed Hedonic-Hierarchical Approach 
ETA 124.2004  Paul MENSINK: Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement Under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric 
Information: The Differential Tax Revisited 
NRM 125.2004  Mauro FABIANO, Gabriella CAMARSA, Rosanna DURSI, Roberta IVALDI, Valentina MARIN and Francesca 
PALMISANI: Integrated Environmental Study for Beach Management:A Methodological Approach 
PRA 126.2004  Irena GROSFELD and Iraj HASHI: The Emergence of Large Shareholders in Mass Privatized Firms: Evidence 
from Poland and the Czech Republic 
CCMP 127.2004  Maria
  BERRITTELLA, Andrea
  BIGANO, Roberto
  ROSON and Richard S.J. TOL:  A General Equilibrium 
Analysis of Climate Change Impacts on Tourism 
CCMP 128.2004  Reyer GERLAGH: A Climate-Change Policy Induced Shift from Innovations in Energy Production to Energy 
Savings 
NRM 129.2004  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources, Innovation, and Growth 
PRA 130.2004  Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Mara FACCIO: Reluctant Privatization 
SIEV 131.2004  Riccardo SCARPA and Mara THIENE: Destination Choice Models for Rock Climbing in the Northeast Alps: A 
Latent-Class Approach Based on Intensity of Participation 
SIEV 132.2004  Riccardo SCARPA Kenneth G. WILLIS and Melinda ACUTT: Comparing Individual-Specific Benefit Estimates 
for Public Goods: Finite Versus Continuous Mixing in Logit Models 
IEM 133.2004  Santiago J. RUBIO: On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax Revisited 
ETA 134.2004  Ascensión ANDINA DÍAZ: Political Competition when Media Create Candidates’ Charisma 
SIEV 135.2004  Anna ALBERINI: Robustness of VSL Values from Contingent Valuation Surveys 
CCMP 136.2004  Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: Marginal Abatement Cost Curves in General Equilibrium: The 
Influence of World Energy Prices 
ETA 137.2004  Herbert DAWID, Christophe DEISSENBERG and Pavel ŠEVČIK: Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an 
Environmental Taxation Game  
CCMP 138.2004  ZhongXiang ZHANG: The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund and China 
CCMP 139.2004  Reyer GERLAGH and Marjan W. HOFKES: Time Profile of Climate Change Stabilization Policy 
NRM 140.2004  Chiara D’ALPAOS and Michele MORETTO: The Value of Flexibility in the Italian Water Service Sector: A 
Real Option Analysis 
PRA   141.2004  Patrick BAJARI, Stephanie HOUGHTON and Steven TADELIS (lxxi): Bidding for Incompete Contracts 
PRA 142.2004  Susan ATHEY, Jonathan LEVIN and Enrique SEIRA (lxxi): Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory 
and Evidence from Timber Auctions 
PRA 143.2004  David GOLDREICH (lxxi): Behavioral Biases of Dealers in U.S. Treasury Auctions 
PRA 144.2004  Roberto BURGUET (lxxi): Optimal Procurement Auction for a Buyer with Downward Sloping Demand: More 
Simple Economics 
PRA 145.2004  Ali HORTACSU and Samita SAREEN (lxxi): Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids: An Analysis of 
Information and Strategic Behavior in the Government of Canada Securities Auctions 
PRA 146.2004  Victor GINSBURGH, Patrick LEGROS and Nicolas SAHUGUET (lxxi): How to Win Twice at an Auction. On 
the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets 
PRA 147.2004  Claudio MEZZETTI, Aleksandar PEKEČ and Ilia TSETLIN (lxxi): Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price 
Auctions 
PRA 148.2004  John ASKER and Estelle CANTILLON (lxxi): Equilibrium of Scoring Auctions 
PRA 149.2004  Philip A. HAILE, Han HONG and Matthew SHUM (lxxi): Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First- 
Price Sealed-Bid Auctions 
PRA 150.2004  François DEGEORGE, François DERRIEN and Kent L. WOMACK (lxxi): Quid Pro Quo in IPOs: Why 
Bookbuilding is Dominating Auctions 
CCMP 151.2004  Barbara BUCHNER and Silvia DALL’OLIO: Russia: The Long Road to Ratification. Internal Institution and 
Pressure Groups in the Kyoto Protocol’s Adoption Process 
CCMP 152.2004  Carlo CARRARO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Does Endogenous Technical Change Make a Difference in Climate 
Policy Analysis? A Robustness Exercise with the FEEM-RICE Model 
PRA 153.2004  Alejandro M. MANELLI and Daniel R. VINCENT (lxxi): Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue 
Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly 
ETA 154.2004  Nicola ACOCELLA, Giovanni Di BARTOLOMEO and Wilfried PAUWELS: Is there any Scope for Corporatism 
in Stabilization Policies? 
CTN 155.2004  Johan EYCKMANS  and Michael FINUS: An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with 
Externalities 
CCMP 156.2004  Cesare DOSI and Michele MORETTO: Environmental Innovation, War of Attrition and Investment Grants CCMP 157.2004  Valentina BOSETTI, Marzio GALEOTTI and Alessandro LANZA: How Consistent are Alternative Short-Term 
Climate Policies with Long-Term Goals? 
ETA 158.2004  Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-Ichi AKAO: Non-pecuniary Value of Employment and Individual Labor Supply 
ETA 159.2004  William BROCK and Anastasios XEPAPADEAS:  Spatial Analysis: Development of Descriptive and Normative 
Methods with Applications to Economic-Ecological Modelling 
KTHC 160.2004  Alberto PETRUCCI: On the Incidence of a Tax on PureRent with Infinite Horizons 
IEM 161.2004  Xavier LABANDEIRA, José M. LABEAGA and Miguel RODRÍGUEZ: Microsimulating the Effects of Household 
Energy Price Changes in Spain 
 
 
NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2005 
    
CCMP 1.2005  Stéphane HALLEGATTE: Accounting for Extreme Events in the Economic Assessment of Climate Change 
CCMP 2.2005  Qiang WU and Paulo Augusto NUNES: Application of Technological Control Measures on Vehicle Pollution: A 
Cost-Benefit Analysis in China 
CCMP 3.2005  Andrea BIGANO, Jacqueline M. HAMILTON, Maren LAU, Richard S.J. TOL and Yuan ZHOU: A Global 
Database of Domestic and International Tourist Numbers at National and Subnational Level 
CCMP 4.2005  Andrea BIGANO, Jacqueline M. HAMILTON and Richard S.J. TOL: The Impact of Climate on Holiday 
Destination Choice 
ETA 5.2005  Hubert KEMPF: Is Inequality Harmful for the Environment in a Growing Economy? 
CCMP 6.2005  Valentina BOSETTI, 
 Carlo CARRARO and Marzio GALEOTTI: The Dynamics of Carbon and Energy Intensity 
in a Model of Endogenous Technical Change 
IEM 7.2005  David CALEF and Robert GOBLE: The Allure of Technology: How France and California Promoted Electric 
Vehicles to Reduce Urban Air Pollution 
ETA 8.2005  Lorenzo PELLEGRINI and Reyer GERLAGH: An Empirical Contribution to the Debate on Corruption 
Democracy and Environmental Policy 
CCMP 9.2005  Angelo ANTOCI: Environmental Resources Depletion and Interplay Between Negative and Positive Externalities 
in a Growth Model 
CTN 10.2005  Frédéric DEROIAN: Cost-Reducing Alliances and Local Spillovers 
NRM 11.2005  Francesco SINDICO: The GMO Dispute before the WTO: Legal Implications for the Trade and Environment 
Debate  
KTHC 12.2005  Carla MASSIDDA: Estimating the New Keynesian Phillips Curve for Italian Manufacturing Sectors 
KTHC 13.2005  Michele MORETTO and Gianpaolo ROSSINI: Start-up Entry Strategies: Employer vs. Nonemployer firms 
PRCG 14.2005  Clara GRAZIANO and Annalisa LUPORINI: Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and Optimal Board 
Structure 
CSRM 15.2005  Parashar KULKARNI: Use of Ecolabels in Promoting Exports from Developing Countries to Developed 
Countries: Lessons from the Indian LeatherFootwear Industry 
KTHC 16.2005  Adriana DI LIBERTO, Roberto MURA and Francesco PIGLIARU: How to Measure the Unobservable: A Panel 
Technique for the Analysis of TFP Convergence 
KTHC 17.2005  Alireza NAGHAVI: Asymmetric Labor Markets, Southern Wages, and the Location of Firms 
KTHC 18.2005  Alireza NAGHAVI: Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North-South Technology Transfer 
KTHC 19.2005  Mombert HOPPE: Technology Transfer Through Trade 
PRCG 20.2005  Roberto ROSON: Platform Competition with Endogenous Multihoming 
CCMP 21.2005  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs. A Game Theoretic 
Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes 
IEM 22.2005  Fausto CAVALLARO: An Integrated Multi-Criteria System to Assess Sustainable Energy Options: An 
Application of the Promethee Method 
CTN 23.2005  Michael FINUS, Pierre v. MOUCHE and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria 
IEM 24.2005  Wietze LISE: Decomposition of CO2 Emissions over 1980–2003 in Turkey 
CTN 25.2005  Somdeb LAHIRI: The Core of Directed Network Problems with Quotas 
SIEV 26.2005  Susanne MENZEL and Riccardo SCARPA: Protection Motivation Theory and Contingent Valuation: Perceived 
Realism, Threat and WTP Estimates for Biodiversity Protection 
NRM 27.2005  Massimiliano MAZZANTI and Anna MONTINI: The Determinants of Residential Water Demand Empirical 
Evidence for a Panel of Italian Municipalities 
CCMP 28.2005  Laurent GILOTTE and Michel de LARA: Precautionary Effect and Variations of the Value of Information 
NRM 29.2005  Paul SARFO-MENSAH: Exportation of Timber in Ghana: The Menace of Illegal Logging Operations 
CCMP 30.2005  Andrea BIGANO, Alessandra GORIA, Jacqueline HAMILTON and Richard S.J. TOL: The Effect of Climate 
Change and Extreme Weather Events on Tourism 
NRM 31.2005  Maria Angeles GARCIA-VALIÑAS: Decentralization and Environment: An Application to Water Policies 
NRM 32.2005  Chiara D’ALPAOS, Cesare DOSI and Michele MORETTO:  Concession Length and Investment Timing 
Flexibility 
CCMP 33.2005  Joseph HUBER: Key Environmental Innovations 
CTN 34.2005  Antoni CALVÓ-ARMENGOL and Rahmi İLKILIÇ (lxxii): Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network 
Formation 
CTN 35.2005  Francesco FERI (lxxii): Network Formation with Endogenous Decay 
CTN 36.2005  Frank H. PAGE, Jr. and Myrna H. WOODERS (lxxii): Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and 
Network Formation Games CTN 37.2005  Alessandra CASELLA and Nobuyuki HANAKI (lxxii): Information Channels in Labor Markets. On the 
Resilience of Referral Hiring 
CTN 38.2005  Matthew O. JACKSON and Alison WATTS (lxxii): Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated 
Games 
CTN 39.2005  Anna BOGOMOLNAIA, Michel LE BRETON, Alexei SAVVATEEV and Shlomo WEBER (lxxii): The Egalitarian 
Sharing Rule in Provision of Public Projects 
CTN 40.2005  Francesco FERI: Stochastic Stability in Network with Decay 
CTN 41.2005  Aart de ZEEUW (lxxii): Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements 
NRM 42.2005 
C. Martijn van der HEIDE, Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH, Ekko C. van IERLAND and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: 
Measuring the Economic Value of Two Habitat Defragmentation Policy Scenarios for the Veluwe, The 
Netherlands 
PRCG 43.2005  Carla VIEIRA and Ana Paula SERRA: Abnormal Returns in Privatization Public Offerings: The Case of 
Portuguese Firms 
SIEV 44.2005  Anna ALBERINI, Valentina ZANATTA and Paolo ROSATO:  Combining Actual and Contingent Behavior to 
Estimate the Value of Sports Fishing in the Lagoon of Venice 
CTN 45.2005  Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The 
Role of Timing and Regulation 
CCMP 46.2005  Lorenzo PELLEGRINI and Reyer GERLAGH: Are EU Environmental Policies Too Demanding for New 
Members States? 
IEM 47.2005  Matteo MANERA: Modeling Factor Demands with SEM and VAR: An Empirical Comparison 
CTN 48.2005  Olivier TERCIEUX and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH (lxx): A Characterization of Stochastically Stable 
Networks 
CTN 49.2005  Ana MAULEON, José SEMPERE-MONERRIS and Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH (lxxii): R&D Networks 
Among Unionized Firms 
CTN 50.2005  Carlo CARRARO, Johan EYCKMANS and Michael FINUS: Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in 
International Environmental Agreements 
KTHC 51.2005  Valeria GATTAI: From the Theory of the Firm to FDI and Internalisation:A Survey 
CCMP 52.2005  Alireza NAGHAVI: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Trade Obligations: A Theoretical Analysis of 
the Doha Proposal 
SIEV 53.2005 
Margaretha BREIL, Gretel GAMBARELLI and  Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: Economic Valuation of On Site Material 
Damages of High Water on Economic Activities based in the City of Venice: Results from a Dose-Response-
Expert-Based Valuation Approach 
ETA 54.2005  Alessandra del BOCA, Marzio GALEOTTI, Charles P. HIMMELBERG and Paola ROTA: Investment and Time 
to Plan: A Comparison of Structures vs. Equipment in a Panel of Italian Firms 
CCMP 55.2005  Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: Emissions Trading, CDM, JI, and More – The Climate Strategy of the 
EU 
ETA 56.2005  Maia DAVID and Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNÉ: Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry 
ETA 57.2005  Alain-Désiré NIMUBONA and Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNÉ: The Pigouvian Tax Rule in the Presence of an 
Eco-Industry 
NRM 58.2005  Helmut KARL, Antje MÖLLER, Ximena MATUS, Edgar GRANDE and Robert KAISER: Environmental 
Innovations: Institutional Impacts on Co-operations for Sustainable Development 
SIEV 59.2005  Dimitra VOUVAKI and Anastasios XEPAPADEAS  (lxxiii): Criteria for Assessing Sustainable 
Development: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence for the Case of Greece 
CCMP 60.2005  Andreas LÖSCHEL and Dirk T.G. RÜBBELKE: Impure Public Goods and Technological Interdependencies 
PRCG 61.2005  Christoph A. SCHALTEGGER and Benno TORGLER: Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with 
Swiss Data 
ETA 62.2005  Irene VALSECCHI: A Role for Instructions 
NRM 63.2005  Valentina BOSETTI and Gianni LOCATELLI: A Data Envelopment Analysis Approach to the Assessment of 
Natural Parks’ Economic Efficiency and Sustainability. The Case of Italian National Parks 
SIEV 64.2005  Arianne T. de BLAEIJ, Paulo A.L.D. NUNES and Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH: Modeling ‘No-choice’ 
Responses in Attribute Based Valuation Surveys 
CTN 65.2005  Carlo CARRARO, Carmen MARCHIORI and Alessandra SGOBBI: Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water 
Issues 
CTN 66.2005  Carlo CARRARO, Carmen MARCHIORI and Alessandra SGOBBI: Advances in Negotiation Theory: 
Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness 
KTHC 67.2005  Sandra WALLMAN  (lxxiv): Network Capital and Social Trust: Pre-Conditions for ‘Good’ Diversity? 
KTHC 68.2005  Asimina CHRISTOFOROU (lxxiv): On the Determinants of Social Capital in Greece Compared to Countries of 
the European Union 
KTHC 69.2005  Eric M. USLANER  (lxxiv): Varieties of Trust  
KTHC 70.2005  Thomas P. LYON  (lxxiv): Making Capitalism Work: Social Capital and Economic Growth in Italy, 1970-1995 
KTHC 71.2005  Graziella BERTOCCHI and Chiara STROZZI (lxxv): Citizenship Laws and International Migration in Historical 
Perspective 
KTHC 72.2005  Elsbeth van HYLCKAMA VLIEG (lxxv): Accommodating Differences 
KTHC 73.2005  Renato SANSA and Ercole SORI (lxxv): Governance of Diversity Between Social Dynamics and Conflicts in 
Multicultural Cities. A Selected Survey on Historical Bibliography 
IEM 74.2005 
Alberto LONGO and Anil MARKANDYA: Identification of Options and Policy Instruments for the Internalisation 
of External Costs of Electricity Generation. Dissemination of External Costs of Electricity Supply Making 
Electricity External Costs Known to Policy-Makers  MAXIMA IEM 75.2005  Margherita GRASSO and Matteo MANERA: Asymmetric Error Correction Models for the Oil-Gasoline Price 
Relationship 
ETA 76.2005  Umberto CHERUBINI  and Matteo MANERA: Hunting the Living Dead A “Peso Problem” in Corporate 
Liabilities Data 
CTN 77.2005  Hans-Peter WEIKARD: Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule 
ETA 78.2005  Joëlle NOAILLY, Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH and Cees A. WITHAGEN (lxxvi): Local and Global 
Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game 
ETA 79.2005  Joëlle NOAILLY, Cees A. WITHAGEN and  Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH (lxxvi): Spatial Evolution of Social 
Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game 
CCMP 80.2005  Massimiliano MAZZANTI and Roberto ZOBOLI: Economic Instruments and Induced Innovation: The Case of 
End-of-Life Vehicles European Policies 
NRM 81.2005  Anna LASUT: Creative Thinking and Modelling for the Decision Support in Water Management 
CCMP 82.2005  Valentina BOSETTI and Barbara BUCHNER: Using Data Envelopment Analysis to Assess the Relative 
Efficiency of Different Climate Policy Portfolios 
ETA 83.2005  Ignazio MUSU: Intellectual Property Rights and Biotechnology: How to Improve the Present Patent System  
KTHC 84.2005  Giulio CAINELLI, Susanna MANCINELLI and Massimiliano MAZZANTI: Social Capital, R&D and Industrial 
Districts 
ETA 85.2005  Rosella LEVAGGI, Michele MORETTO and Vincenzo REBBA: Quality and Investment Decisions in Hospital 
Care when Physicians are Devoted Workers 
CCMP 86.2005  Valentina BOSETTI and Laurent GILOTTE: Carbon Capture and Sequestration: How Much Does this Uncertain 
Option Affect Near-Term Policy Choices? 
CSRM 87.2005  Nicoletta FERRO: Value Through Diversity: Microfinance and Islamic Finance and  Global Banking  
ETA 88.2005  A. MARKANDYA and S. PEDROSO: How Substitutable is Natural Capital? 
IEM 89.2005  Anil MARKANDYA, Valeria COSTANTINI, Francesco GRACCEVA and Giorgio VICINI: Security of Energy 
Supply: Comparing Scenarios From a European Perspective 
CCMP 90.2005  Vincent M. OTTO, Andreas LÖSCHEL and Rob DELLINK: Energy Biased Technical Change: A CGE Analysis 
PRCG 91.2005  Carlo CAPUANO: Abuse of Competitive Fringe 
PRCG 92.2005  Ulrich BINDSEIL, Kjell G. NYBORG and Ilya A. STREBULAEV (lxv): Bidding and Performance in Repo 
Auctions: Evidence from ECB Open Market Operations 
CCMP 93.2005  Sabrina AUCI and Leonardo BECCHETTI: The Stability of the Adjusted and Unadjusted Environmental 
Kuznets Curve 
CCMP 94.2005  Francesco BOSELLO and Jian ZHANG: Assessing Climate Change Impacts: Agriculture 
CTN 95.2005  Alejandro CAPARRÓS, Jean-Christophe PEREAU and Tarik TAZDAÏT: Bargaining with Non-Monolithic 
Players 
ETA 96.2005  William BROCK and Anastasios XEPAPADEAS (lxxvi): Optimal Control and Spatial Heterogeneity: Pattern 
Formation in Economic-Ecological Models 
CCMP 97.2005  Francesco BOSELLO, Roberto ROSON  and Richard S.J. TOL (lxxvii): Economy-Wide Estimates of the 
Implications of Climate Change: Human Health 
CCMP 98.2005  Rob DELLINK, Michael FINUS and Niels OLIEMAN: Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability 
Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement 
CTN 99.2005 
Valeria COSTANTINI, Riccardo CRESCENZI, Fabrizio De FILIPPIS, and Luca SALVATICI: Bargaining 
Coalitions in the Agricultural Negotiations of the Doha Round: Similarity of Interests or Strategic Choices?  
An Empirical Assessment 
IEM 100.2005  Giliola FREY and Matteo MANERA: Econometric Models of Asymmetric Price Transmission 
IEM 101.2005  Alessandro COLOGNI and Matteo MANERA: Oil Prices, Inflation and Interest Rates in a Structural 
Cointegrated VAR Model for the G-7 Countries 
KTHC 102.2005  Chiara M. TRAVISI and Roberto CAMAGNI: Sustainability of Urban Sprawl: Environmental-Economic 
Indicators for the Analysis of Mobility Impact in Italy 
ETA 103.2005  Livingstone S. LUBOOBI and Joseph Y.T. MUGISHA: HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Africa: Trends and Challenges 
SIEV 104.2005  Anna ALBERINI, Erik LICHTENBERG, Dominic MANCINI, and Gregmar I. GALINATO: Was It Something I 
Ate? Implementation of the FDA Seafood HACCP Program 
SIEV 105.2005  Anna ALBERINI and Aline CHIABAI: Urban Environmental Health and Sensitive Populations: How Much are 
the Italians Willing to Pay to Reduce Their Risks?  
 
(lxv) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, 
Evidence and Applications” organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and sponsored by the EU, 
Milan, September 25-27, 2003 
(lxvi) This paper has been presented at the 4
th  BioEcon Workshop on “Economic Analysis of Policies 
for Biodiversity Conservation” organised on behalf of the BIOECON Network by Fondazione Eni 
Enrico Mattei, Venice International University (VIU) and University College London (UCL) , Venice, 
August 28-29, 2003 
(lxvii) This paper has been presented at the international conference on “Tourism and Sustainable 
Economic Development – Macro and Micro Economic Issues” jointly organised by CRENoS 
(Università di Cagliari e Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and supported by the World 
Bank, Sardinia, September 19-20, 2003 
(lxviii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Governance and Policies in 
Multicultural Cities”, Rome, June 5-6, 2003 
(lxix) This paper was presented at  the Fourth EEP Plenary Workshop and EEP Conference “The 
Future of Climate Policy”, Cagliari, Italy, 27-28 March 2003 
(lxx) This paper was presented at the 9
th Coalition Theory Workshop on "Collective Decisions and 
Institutional Design" organised by the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and held in Barcelona, 
Spain, January 30-31, 2004 
(lxxi) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, 
Evidence and Applications”, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Consip and sponsored 
by the EU, Rome, September 23-25, 2004 
(lxxii) This paper was presented at the 10
th  Coalition Theory Network Workshop held in Paris, France 
on 28-29 January 2005 and organised by EUREQua. 
(lxxiii) This paper was presented at the 2nd Workshop on "Inclusive Wealth and Accounting Prices" 
held in Trieste, Italy on 13-15 April 2005 and organised by the Ecological and Environmental 
Economics - EEE Programme, a joint three-year programme of  ICTP - The Abdus Salam International 
Centre for Theoretical Physics, FEEM - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and The Beijer International 
Institute of Ecological Economics 
(lxxiv) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Trust and social capital in 
multicultural cities” Athens, January 19-20, 2004 
(lxxv) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Diversity as a source of growth” Rome
November 18-19, 2004  
(lxxvi) This paper was presented at the 3rd Workshop on Spatial-Dynamic Models of Economics and 
Ecosystems held in Trieste on 11-13 April 2005 and organised by the Ecological and Environmental 
Economics - EEE Programme, a joint three-year programme of ICTP - The Abdus Salam International 
Centre for Theoretical Physics, FEEM - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and The Beijer International 
Institute of Ecological Economics 
(lxxvii) This paper was presented at the Workshop on Infectious Diseases: Ecological and Economic 
Approaches held in Trieste on 13-15 April 2005 and organised by the Ecological and Environmental 
Economics - EEE Programme, a joint three-year programme of ICTP - The Abdus Salam International 
Centre for Theoretical Physics, FEEM - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and The Beijer International 




  2004 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  GG  Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRA  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 




  2005 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRCG  Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 